# PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS IN CHINA AND VIETNAM PART 2-2

Chia sẻ: Minh Nguyen | Ngày: | Loại File: PDF | Số trang:209

0
57
lượt xem
11

## PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS IN CHINA AND VIETNAM PART 2-2

Mô tả tài liệu

There were conspicuous regional differences in the age pyramids of the private entrepreneurs on the one hand between South Vietnam and on the other hand in North and Central Vietnam.

Chủ đề:

Bình luận(0)

Lưu

## Nội dung Text: PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS IN CHINA AND VIETNAM PART 2-2

1. 104 PART TWO: THE STRATEGIC GROUP ENTREPRENEURS 2. Texture, differentiation and strategic capital 2.1. Composition and starting conditions of the interviewed entrepreneurs 2.1.1. Age structure The age structure of the interviewed respondents was similar in both countries. More than two-thirds of the Chinese (70.8%) and Vietnamese entrepreneurs (73.0%) were aged between 30 and 50. This result corresponded to the 1995 Chinese 1% sample amongst private entrepreneurs, according to which 74.9% of the entrepreneurs belonged to this age group.22 But 11.2% (China) and 7.5% (Vietnam) of them were younger than 30. The relatively high total figure for the average of private entrepreneurs in both countries – measured by the aver- age age of the entire population23 – can be explained very well by the fact that as a rule successful manufacture presupposes specific expertise and material conditions which younger sections of the population possess to a much lesser extent than middle-aged or older ones. Capital and professional experience count amongst the preconditions as well as social contacts and connections which one can only build up over a longer period of time. Younger people are mostly involved in the individual business tertiary sector. The age profile of the tertiary sector diverges therefore from the profile in the secondary sector. Work such as trading often presupposes to a lesser extent expertise in a specific field and the deployment of capital than the production of particular goods. The material preconditions at the starting points are at the same time lower (for example necessary production space or equipping with machines), so that younger people find it easier to make a start in trading, but at the same time can quickly earn a lot of money. Regional differences depend on specific local factors. The extremely high, youth unemployment rate in centers of heavy industry such as Baiyin may be the reason why the proportion of under 40-year-olds at 53.1% is clearly higher than in Hangzhou (39.1%) and Luohe (48.4%). The higher share of older peo- ple in Zheijiang, in turn may be caused by the fact that the more specialized structure of industry there requires a higher level of (age determined) experi- ence. There were conspicuous regional differences in the age pyramids of the pri- vate entrepreneurs on the one hand between South Vietnam and on the other hand in North and Central Vietnam. In the south the proportion of young entre- preneurs aged maximum 29 (16%) was eight times as high as in North Vietnam with 2%; in Central Vietnam there was not one single representative of this age 22Zhang, Li and Xie 1996: 157; similarly: Zhang 2000. 23According to the Chinese Microcensus in 1995 about 28% belonged to the age-group be- tween 30 and 50, cf.. Zhongguo renkou tongji nianjian 1996: 76/77. In the Chinese age pyramid in 1995 53% of the population were younger than 30, 18.9% between 20 and 29 years old. In Vietnam 39% were between 15 and 34, 18,4% between 15 and 24, Thuc trang Lao Dong - Viec Lam 1998: 49.
2. DIFFERENTIATION AND STRATEGIC CAPITAL 105 group. If one merged the age group under 40 years with that of the 29s or under, then almost half of the South Vietnamese group of entrepreneurs would be grouped under that heading, whereas in Central Vietnam only one-fifth would belong to it. The high rate of employment amongst young people in the south and the regional strongly marked culture of entrepreneurship may play a role in this trend. 2.1.2. Familial and social origins The majority of the respondents interviewed in China stem from peasant fami- lies (44.1%). This can be seen in a different light, however, in the urban-rural comparison. As far as the employment background of the father of the entre- preneurs is concerned, in the urban areas the cadre/manager is the largest group, and in the countryside still the second largest. However, the share of those who had earlier been dubbed “class enemies” (capitalists or large land owners before 1949), as part of their background was relatively low at 3.9%. However, it may very well be that not every respondent was willing to speak openly of that syn- drome in his or her family background. A nationwide Chinese survey found a proportion of as much as 7.1% of the respondents interviewed who stemmed from “black families” (former large land-owners, wealthy peasants, capitalists, “reactionary” officers and civil servants).24 The proportion of fathers with management experience was at 25% in the urban areas clearly higher than the proportion of administrative cadres (14.8%). The high percentage of peasants indicates on the one hand close relations with the urban area, shows on the other hand, that despite their peasant backgrounds a significant part of the present-day entrepreneurial strata have succeeded in establishing themselves in the non-agrarian sector in the cities. In any case only 4.6% of the entrepreneurs before taking up entrepreneurial activity had them- selves been working as peasants. As the qualitative interviews showed, having originated from the peasantry and the lower social prestige associated with it, in the circle of persons concerned, fewer reservations were to be found against becoming an entrepreneur which is for the moment (still) negatively assessed in social terms. On the other hand the low social status of peasants may have strengthened the wish for social ascent, and thirdly the cultural heritage of the peasants provides some motivational impulse. An entrepreneur of peasant ori- gins expressed it thus: “We don’t have any anxiety when faced with difficulties and permanently hard work”. 24 “Zhongguo siying qiye yanjiu” ketizu (1999): 153.
3. 106 Table 23: Last profession of the father (China) PART TWO: THE STRATEGIC GROUP ENTREPRENEURS City Countryside Total Profession Number % Number % Number % Technician 2 1.9 2 2.9 4 2.3 Cadre/ Manager 43 39.8 15 21.7 58 32.8 Blue or white-collar employee 19 17.6 8 11.6 27 15.3 Peasant 38 35.2 40 58.0 78 44.1 Individual laborers 6 5.6 4 5.8 10 5.6 Total 108 100.0 69 100.0 177 100.0 Source: Own survey.
5. 108 Table 24: Occupations of the entrepreneurs interviewed before founding their companies (China) City Countryside Total Occupation Number % Number % Number % PART TWO: THE STRATEGIC GROUP ENTREPRENEURS Technician 13 12.0 3 4.4 16 9.0 Cadres in civil service 7 6.5 3 4.4 10 5.7 Rural cadres 4 3.7 7 10.1 11 6.2 Manager in state or collective 48 44.4 26 37.7 74 41.8 firms Blue or white-collar workers 20 18.6 7 10.1 27 15.3 in state or collective firms Peasants 5 4.6 11 15.9 16 9.0 Individual laborers 11 10.2 12 17.4 23 13.0 Total 108 100.0 69 100.0 177 100.0 Source: Own survey.
16. DIFFERENTIATION AND STRATEGIC CAPITAL 119 The access to real estate for commercial premises is a further problem. Accord- ing to the national land law only state and collective enterprises have a claim to be granted land. But private companies can lease plots of land. This can take place in two ways: either they find a state or collective institution which in their own name purchases a piece of land, in turn, to be leased to the private compa- nies in question. Or the private entrepreneur undertakes a joint venture with the public sector company. An example of that is the Xiaohesan Ltd. in Hangzhou which set up a large amusement center on land belonging to a municipality. The municipality regarded the granting of the use of the land as a form of capi- tal investment, and received from this “investment” significant royalties. In the three regions examined by us the local governments set up at the same time “business development zones” in which land was also leased to private compa- nies. In Vietnam the factual circumstances resembled those in China. Bank credits were hardly available, and if they were, then exorbitant rates of interest had to be paid. Often money has to be privately loaned for which exorbitant interest rates are charged. The colossal strains created by the interest rates hinder in both countries the qualitative consolidation of the private sector. A specific factor is the capital possessed by Overseas Vietnamese, the Viet Kieu. Offi- cially their willingness to invest in their homeland is welcomed and supported by the Vietnamese government. This is done in the hope of a similar positive impact on the development of the country as has been the case with the Over- seas Chinese in China. The two cases are, however, only to a limited extent comparable. Overseas Chinese have been able over a longer period of time – to some extent over a number of generations – to accumulate capital abroad suc- cessfully. Vietnamese first in the late 1960s and especially in the 1970s went abroad in large numbers. The period of time is comparatively little to accumulate sufficient capital that might be rewarded by investments in Vietnam. The geographical closeness of the successful Overseas Chinese in Singa- pore, Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia to China made it easier for them to invest in their home country. Many Overseas Vietnamese, in contrast, live far from their native countries in the USA or in Europe. At present a significant amount of distrust still exists between Overseas Vietnamese and the Vietnamese state. On top of that there are unrealistic expectations of the financial power of the Overseas Vietnamese. The official investment activity of the Viet Kieu in Vietnam was as a result up to 1996 relatively modest: merely 34 projects with a volume in total of US- $107 m were officially licensed. At any rate half of that was situated in the secondary sector that implied a more long-term investment activity (in contrast to the tertiary sector which permits short-term investment and promises rapid net profits). That expresses a certain level of confidence in the government’s 17. 120 PART TWO: THE STRATEGIC GROUP ENTREPRENEURS reform policies. But in relation to the total amount of foreign investment, the Viet Kieu investment seems rather modest in comparison. According to official statistics, up till January 1996 merely 1,354 projects with a total volume of (US)$18.59 billion had been officially approved.42 The actual impact of Overseas Vietnamese investment is, nevertheless larger than one would expect from these figures. Because on the one hand a section of the (US) $600–700 foreign investment which annually flows in to the country and which is transferred to the relatives of the Overseas Vietnamese for the upkeep of the families, is in turn used by the latter to found companies. On the other hand a significant sum of Overseas Vietnamese capital flows outside of the official bank channels in to the country. Estimates speak of (US)$1-2 billion per year, of which a part runs directly into founding small and micro-companies whereas a further part flows into the illegal finance sector which provide credits to feed those private entrepreneurs who do not get (or want) a bank to provide a credit.43 A young female Canadian Vietnamese provides an example. During her pe- riod of residence over many years in Canada, she put to one side (US) \$50,000 which she invested in a bakery which was registered in the name of her mother who lived in Ho Chi Minh City. Her mother already possessed a house standing empty with floor space of above 200 square meters which could be used as a production and marketing area, so the money could be used to purchase ma- chines and raw materials. The machines were purchased out of the stock left by a Taiwanese bakery firm that went bankrupt. In order to avoid possible compli- cations, the Canadian Vietnamese woman remained in the background as far as the Vietnamese authorities were concerned.44 2.1.4. Prerequisites for founding a company: human capital 2.1.4.1. China The entrepreneur’s skills and qualifications are an important precondition for commercial success. Amongst them count not only education and training but rather economic and social competence too. In our questionnaire we asked about the important factors for social success, 67.4% of the respondents in China named “own skills” and 83.7% “good knowledge of the market” as guar- antees for entrepreneurial success. 42 Vietnam Economic Times, February 1996: 10, table “Total Foreign Investment by Sector”. 43 On the Viet Kieu see amongst others Cao Ly Dung 1996a and 1996b; Korsmoe 1996. 44 Interview, Ho-Chi Minh City, 28 November 1996.