Xem 1-11 trên 11 kết quả Rent seeking
  • Gordon Tullock, eminent political economist and one of the founders of public choice, offers this new and fascinating look at how governments and externalities are linked. Economists frequently justify government as dealing with externalities, defined as benefits or costs that are generated as the result of an economic activity, but that do not accrue directly to those involved in the activity. In this original work, Gordon Tullock posits that government can also create externalities. In doing so, he looks at governmental activity that internalizes such externalities.

    pdf163p orchid_1 27-09-2012 46 19   Download

  • Dân trong ngành quản trị kinh doanh nói riêng và kinh tế nói chung có những từ ngữ đặc biệt, có thể gây khó hiểu do người “ngoại đạo”. Ví dụ, từ “rent-seeking” nghe qua tưởng đâu là tìm kiếm tiền thuê nhà! “Rent-seeking” có thể hiểu nôm na là “chạy chọt”, tức là lợi dụng quan hệ, tìm cách vận động hành lang để doanh nghiệp mình hưởng lợi, doanh nghiệp đối thủ bị thua thiệt.

    pdf59p anhvu 19-03-2009 554 310   Download

  • Dân trong ngành quản trị kinh doanh nói riêng và kinh tế nói chung có những từ ngữ đặc biệt, có thể gây khó hiểu do người “ngoại đạo”. Ví dụ, từ “rent-seeking” nghe qua tưởng đâu là tìm kiếm tiền thuê nhà! “Rent-seeking” có thể hiểu nôm na là “chạy chọt”, tức là lợi dụng quan hệ, tìm cách vận động hành lang để doanh nghiệp mình hưởng lợi, doanh nghiệp đối thủ bị thua thiệt.

    pdf58p gackiem196 19-04-2011 128 55   Download

  • Cạnh tranh bằng giá Nguyễn Vạn Phú Dân trong ngành quản trị kinh doanh nói riêng và kinh tế nói chung có những từ ngữ đặc biệt, có thể gây khó hiểu do người “ngoại đạo”. Ví dụ, từ “rent-seeking” nghe qua tưởng đâu là tìm kiếm tiền thuê nhà! “Rent-seeking” có thể hiểu nôm na là “chạy chọt”, tức là lợi dụng quan hệ, tìm cách vận động hành lang để doanh nghiệp mình

    pdf12p kemoc10 05-08-2011 49 16   Download

  • This study examines the relations between earnings informativeness, measured by the earnings-return relation, and the ownership structure of 977 companies in seven East Asian economies. Our results are consistent with two complementary explanations. First, concentrated ownership and the associated pyramidal and cross-holding structures create agency conflicts between controlling owners and outside investors. Consequently, controlling owners are perceived to report accounting information for self-interested purposes, causing the reported earnings to lose credibility to outside investors.

    pdf200p bin_pham 06-02-2013 25 7   Download

  • Petroleum taxation is the universal instrument through which governments seek to determine the crucial balance between the financial interests of the oil companies and the owners of the resource. This book addresses how governments have and continue to approach this problem, the impacts of different policy choices and how these are being adapted to changing business conditions. Carole Nakhle presents the reader with an illuminating and robust analysis of the entire taxation story, from the basic theoretical considerations through to advanced computations applied to various tax regimes....

    pdf277p layon_5 28-03-2013 20 7   Download

  • For a long time economists have warned that abundant natural resources are bad for economic development because their exploitation stunts manufacturing exports, favours rent-seeking activities by politically well-connected people, and generally leads to unsustainable policies for which, as so often, the poor end up paying the price with lost growth and opportunity. But over the last few years the so-called resource curse has been revisited as historically uninformed, theoretically unsatisfactory, empirically incorrect, and largely useless for development policy....

    pdf1p chieckhanpieu 20-03-2013 16 3   Download

  • In the early stages of my work on crime, I was puzzled by why theft is socially harmful since it appears merely to redistribute resources, usually from wealthier to poorer individuals. I resolved the puzzle (Becker [1968, fn. 3] by recognizing that criminals spend on weapons and on the value of the time in planning and carrying out their crimes, and that such spending is socially unproductive - it is what is now called “rent-seeking” - because it does not create wealth, only forcibly redistributes it.

    pdf13p trinhcaidat 19-04-2013 29 2   Download

  • For a long time economists have warned that abundant natural resources are bad for economic development because their exploitation stunts manufacturing exports, favours rent-seeking activities by politically well-connected people, and generally leads to unsustainable policies for which, as so often, the poor end up paying the price with lost growth and opportunity. But over the last few years the so-called resource curse has

    pdf0p quatet 14-01-2013 13 1   Download

  • Chapter 7, Taxation and government intervention. After reading this chapter, you should be able to: Show how equilibrium maximizes producer and consumer surplus, demonstrate the burden of taxation to consumers and producers, explain how government intervention is a type of implicit taxation, define rent seeking and show how it is related to elasticity.

    ppt17p whocare_b 06-09-2016 1 0   Download

  • Going forward, the upward pressure on rents is likely to continue, albeit at a moderate pace. The shortage of available land, coupled with very high land prices restricts further office space develop- ments, particularly in the CBD. Moreover, the current financial and economic slowdown means that fewer new enterprises will seek to enter the Turkish market in the next 24 months. The current supply pipeline will then limit rental growth.

    pdf24p quaivatxanh 30-11-2012 15 3   Download

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