intTypePromotion=4
ADSENSE

Crop insurance

Xem 1-20 trên 51 kết quả Crop insurance
  • For the broader farm community, given that many farmers and ranchers who do not benefit from commodity programs use crop insurance as their primary or perhaps only federal risk management tool, policymakers may consider how effective federal crop insurance has been for producers of specialty crops and livestock. Across the federal government, controlling or reducing program costs continues to be an issue.

    pdf24p quaivatxanh 29-11-2012 46 5   Download

  • Since 1980, the principal form of crop loss assistance in the United States has been provided through the Federal Crop Insurance Program. The Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 was intended to replace disaster programs with a subsidized insurance program that farmers could depend on in the event of crop losses. Crop insurance was seen as preferable to disaster assistance because it was less costly and hence could be provided to more producers, was less likely to encourage moral hazard, and less likely to encourage producers to plant crops on marginal lands.

    pdf21p quaivatxanh 29-11-2012 42 4   Download

  • In conducting their operations, farmers are exposed to financial losses because of production risks—droughts, floods, and other natural disasters—as well as price risks. The federal government has played an active role in helping to mitigate the effects of these risks on farm income by promoting the use of crop insurance. RMA has overall responsibility for administering the federal crop insurance program, including controlling costs and protecting against fraud, waste, and abuse.

    pdf50p thangbienthai 27-11-2012 56 9   Download

  • Congress established a standing disaster program in the 2008 farm bill— the Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments Program. Under this program, Congress funded a $3.8 billion permanent trust fund and directed the Secretary of Agriculture to make crop disaster assistance payments to eligible farmers who suffer crop losses on or before September 30, 2011. USDA—through FSA—began making disaster payments under this program in early 2010 for crop losses incurred in 2008.

    pdf75p thangbienthai 27-11-2012 38 8   Download

  • Most crop insurance policies are either production-based or revenue- based. For production-based policies, a farmer can receive a payment if there is a production loss relative to the farmer’s historical production per acre. Revenue-based policies protect against crop revenue loss resulting from declines in production, price, or both.

    pdf0p thangbienthai 27-11-2012 53 7   Download

  • ARPA and the 2008 farm bill set premium subsidy rates, that is, the percentage of the premium paid by the government. Premium subsidy rates vary by the level of insurance coverage that the farmer chooses and the geographic diversity of the crops insured. For most policies, the statutory subsidy rates range from 38 percent to 80 percent. Table 1 shows the total costs of subsidies for all crop insurance premiums and administrative expenses for 2000 through 2011.

    pdf78p thangbienthai 27-11-2012 55 6   Download

  • Over the next 10 years, federal spending on crop insurance is projected to outpace spending on traditional commodity programs by about one-third, which might capture the attention of budget cutters looking for potential sources of savings. Insurance companies, farm groups, and some members of Congress are concerned that additional reductions in federal support will negatively impact the financial health of the crop insurance industry and possibly jeopardize the delivery of crop insurance.

    pdf28p quaivatxanh 29-11-2012 45 6   Download

  • One of the reasons private crop insurance markets have not developed is the relatively low demand for crop insurance. Despite large subsidies in the United States, crop insurance participation historically has been relatively low. Farmers and ranchers use a variety of risk management strategies to mitigate the risks they face (Harwood, Heifner, Coble, Perry, and Somwaru, 1999; U.S. GAO, 1999), many of which compete with crop insurance. These include futures and options markets, contracting, cultural practices that reduce crop loss (e.g.

    pdf10p quaivatxanh 29-11-2012 50 5   Download

  • Federal crop insurance policies are generally either yield-based or revenue-based. For most yield- based policies, a producer can receive an indemnity if there is a yield loss relative to the farmer’s “normal” (historical) yield. Revenue-based policies were developed after yield-based policies, in the mid-1990s, to protect against crop revenue loss resulting from declines in yield, price, or both. The most recent addition has been products that protect against losses in whole farm revenue rather than just for an individual crop.

    pdf16p quaivatxanh 29-11-2012 42 5   Download

  • The annual agriculture appropriations bill traditionally makes two separate appropriations for the federal crop insurance program. It provides discretionary funding for the salaries and expenses of the RMA. It also provides “such sums as are necessary” for the Federal Crop Insurance Fund, which finances all other expenses of the program, including premium subsidies, indemnity payments, and reimbursements to the private insurance companies. Government costs for crop insurance have increased substantially in recent years. After ranging between $2.1 and $3.

    pdf22p quaivatxanh 29-11-2012 49 5   Download

  • Farmers have several general concerns about crop insurance voiced by national farm organizations representing a cross-section of American agriculture. The American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF) and others would like USDA to address shallow losses, which occur when losses are significant for the farmer but not enough to trigger an indemnity. 31 Also, this group and others point out a need to address declines in actual production history (APH), which is used for determining the insurance guarantee.

    pdf23p quaivatxanh 29-11-2012 47 6   Download

  • Results in this year’s report are not comparable to results in previous editions, because a new procedure was used to weight the final data set. The new weighting procedure, which is described in the Technical Notes, was used to adjust for the lack of respondents who use only cell phones and not landline phones. The reader should not compare results in the Wisconsin Health Insurance Coverage 2007 report with results in this report. Comparisons of 2007 and 2008 results presented in this report (in the Key Findings and elsewhere) were made with a re-weighted version of...

    pdf0p quaivatxanh 01-12-2012 31 5   Download

  • Based on results of the 2008 Family Health Survey, the majority of Wisconsin residents in 2008 had health insurance for the entire past year. That is, they were continuously covered during the 12 months prior to the survey interview. An estimated 4,868,000 residents (89%) were insured for all of the past 12 months. An estimated 319,000 Wisconsin household residents (6%) had no health insurance of any kind during the past 12 months. Another 276,000 residents (5%) had health insurance for part of the year and were uninsured for part of the year. Together, an estimated...

    pdf64p quaivatxanh 01-12-2012 30 5   Download

  • Insurers anticipate this adverse job turnover dynamic. Nevertheless, insurers are expected to renew policies and may be reluctant or prohibited from increasing premiums rapidly. As a result, offered premiums for covering a previously uninsured firm are well above the initial expected costs for the firm’s worker’s current age and gender distributions. Such large premium loadings deter small firms from offering health insurance to their workers. A dynamic adverse selection problem emerges.

    pdf20p quaivatxanh 29-11-2012 41 4   Download

  • A primary justification for government intervention has been the failure of private agricultural insurance markets (see, for example, Appel, Lord, and Harrington, 1999; Hazell, Pomerada, and Valdez, 1986; Goodwin and Smith, 1995). In a 1922 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) bulletin, Valgren describes the disastrous experiences of fire insurance companies that offered crop insurance in the Dakotas and Montana in 1917 and the early 1920s. Severe droughts caused widespread crop losses in those states.

    pdf0p quaivatxanh 29-11-2012 45 4   Download

  • Citing failures of the crop insurance program to attract adequate participation at sufficiently high coverage levels, Congress has passed two crop insurance reform bills since 1980, in 1994 and 2000, that have increased the scope of the program and the size of government costs. The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 provides $8.2 billion in subsidies over five years to encourage the purchase of federal crop insurance.

    pdf19p quaivatxanh 29-11-2012 28 4   Download

  • One of the key characteristics of agriculture is the inherent production risks facing producers from adverse weather, pests, and diseases. These risks have been used to justify government intervention in the form of disaster assistance payments, emergency loans, livestock feed assistance programs, crop insurance, and other subsidized assistance schemes. Yet, while government intervention to provide assistance has been widely supported in the United States, the form of assistance has been much debated.

    pdf28p quaivatxanh 29-11-2012 35 4   Download

  • Prior to the 1930s, there was little federal role in providing disaster assistance to farmers and ranchers. In 1886, Congress appropriated $10,000 for the Department of Agriculture to purchase seed for drought-stricken farmers in Texas, but President Grover Cleveland vetoed the act with the message, “Federal aid in such cases encourages the expectation of paternal care on the part of government and weakens the sturdiness of our national character” (Porter, 1988).

    pdf20p quaivatxanh 29-11-2012 42 4   Download

  • This potential disparity in availability of private insurance between regions and crops is sometimes cited as a reason for government intervention (U.S. GAO, 1980; Appel, Lord, and Harrington, 1999), but here again, crop insurance is not unique. Many risk management tools used by farmers are available only in certain regions. For example, cash forward contracting is widely available for corn and soybean producers in the Midwest, although the same is not necessarily true for producers in regions where basis risk is high.

    pdf18p quaivatxanh 29-11-2012 35 4   Download

  • The availability of crop insurance for a particular crop in a particular region is an administrative decision made by USDA. The decision is made on a crop-by-crop and county-by-county basis, based on farmer demand for coverage and the level of risk associated with the crop in the region, among other factors. In areas where a policy is not available, farmers may request that RMA expand the program to their county. The process usually starts with a pilot program in order for RMA to gain experience and test the program components before it becomes more widely available.

    pdf6p quaivatxanh 29-11-2012 36 4   Download

CHỦ ĐỀ BẠN MUỐN TÌM

ADSENSE

p_strKeyword=Crop insurance
p_strCode=cropinsurance

nocache searchPhinxDoc

 

Đồng bộ tài khoản
2=>2