The increasingly important role played by family firms in China’s fledging capital market calls for a better understanding of how it works and is governed. This study aims to explore how corporate governance issues in family firms are tackled from the perspective of investor protection. The thesis addresses the question by first presenting theoretical models showing the relations among investor protection, family governance, and agency costs in family firms. It then formulates empirical models to test the predictions of the theoretical models by using a unique and detailed family-firm data set in China’s stock markets, one of the largest and fastest growing economies in the world.

In order to distribute earnings to shareholders, besides cash dividend, the firms can also buy back shares. However, compared to cash dividends, share repurchases are less common. Therefore, the thesis only focuses on cash dividend policy of the firms. Specifically, the thesis studies the dividend payment policy of 460 firms listed on HSX and HNX between 2010 and 2016. The data is collected from 2009 to 2017. The data needed for research is extracted from the Datastream database. The final sample includes 2,653 firmyear observations.

Purpose of the study is to build a system of solutions to the improvement effectiveness of preventing and resolving Investor and host state from Vietnam in the context of international economic integration today.