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2.2.2 The relationship between investor sentiment and dividend policy
The catering theory of dividends was developed by Baker and Wurgler (2004a) that based on the ideas of
Shefrin and Statman (1984), whereby firms choose a dividend payment policy to cater to the preference of
the investors. In particular, firms cater to investors by paying dividends when investors place a share price
premium on firms that pay dividends. In contrast, firms will not pay dividends when investors prefer firms
that do not pay dividends. To measure the relative prices of firms that pay dividends and firms that do not
pay dividends, Baker and Wurgler (2004a) use dividend premium. It is the relative market valuation of
dividend payers versus dividend nonpayers. Many empirical studies support the catering theory of dividends,
such as those by Li and Lie (2006), Bulan et al. (2007), Kale et al. (2012), Liu and Chen. (2015), Ferris et al.
(2006), Lee (2010). However, a number of other studies find no evidence to support this theory (Julio and
Ikenberry, 2004; Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009; Li and Zhao, 2008; Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2011; Geiler
and Renneboog, 2015; von Eije and Megginson, 2008). In addition, an international study by Ferris et al.
(2009) and Kuo et al. (2013) find that firms in common law countries cater to the dividend preference of
investors while firms in civil law countries do not. Other studies in emerging markets such as Brazil,
Thailand and Taiwan show that firms cater to the dividend preference of investors (Boulton et al., 2012;
Tangjitprom, 2013; Wang et al. (2016).
2.3 EARNINGS QUALITY AND DIVIDEND POLICY
2.3.1 Earnings quality
The earnings quality is an indicator of the quality of financial reporting. Earnings are of high quality when
they accurately reflect the firm's long-term performance. In contrast, earnings are of low quality when they
are manipulated. The manipulated earnings are the result of intentional intervention of managers in the
preparation of financial statements through accounting options in order to gain benefits either for themselves
or for the firm.
2.3.2 The relationship between earnings quality and dividend policy
The outcome view of Jensen (1986) and La Porta et al. (2000) contends that dividends are the result of
effective governance. Thus, the relationship between earnings quality and dividend policy is positive.
Meanwhile, the substitute view of Rozeff (1982) and La Porta et al. (2000) suggest that dividend policy will
substitute for strong governance. Therefore, the substitute view predicts a negative relationship between
earnings quality and dividend policy. In addition, the information asymmetry between managers and outside
investors causes reverse selection problems and limits the firm's ability to access external capital markets
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). Therefore, from the information asymmetric view, the relationship between
earnings quality and dividend policy is positive, similar to the outcome view of the free cash flow problem.
Besides, under the quiet life hypothesis, managers can abandon positive NPV investment projects when they
are not closely monitored. Assessing the quality of a firm's earnings can motivate managers to work harder.
Thus, the relationship between earnings quality and dividend policy is negative, similar to the substitute view
of the free cash flow problem. Some studies examine the information content of dividends by investigating
whether dividend policy provides information about the quality of earnings. Specifically, Tong and Miao
(2011) find that dividend payment status is an indicator of the quality of a firm’s earnings and a piece of