Tác động của đặc điểm Hội đồng quản trị đến gian lận báo cáo tài chính: Bối cảnh thị trường Việt Nam

Financial reporting fraud (FRF) is a global concern, particularly significant in developing economies like Vietnam, where it erodes investor confidence and hinders economic stability. Accurate financial reporting is crucial for attracting investment and ensuring market transparency. However, persistent high rates of post-audit profit discrepancies in Vietnamese listed companies indicate potential weaknesses in corporate governance mechanisms and a direct impact on investor trust. This study aims to address this critical issue by empirically investigating how specific characteristics of the board of directors and audit quality influence the incidence of financial reporting fraud within Vietnamese listed companies. It seeks to provide valuable insights for enhancing financial integrity and investor trust in the Vietnamese market, thereby contributing to a more robust financial ecosystem.

Academics and researchers in accounting, finance, and corporate governance; managers of listed companies in Vietnam; financial professionals; policymakers; and auditors.

This research comprehensively assesses the influence of corporate governance mechanisms, specifically the characteristics of the board of directors, and audit quality on financial reporting fraud in Vietnam. It postulates that a robust board composition, including independent members, appropriate board size, and financial expertise, alongside high-quality audits, are vital in mitigating fraudulent financial practices. The study extends existing theories on agency and corporate governance by applying them to the specific context of an emerging market like Vietnam. Employing a quantitative approach, the study utilizes a panel dataset derived from 342 listed companies across Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi stock exchanges during the 2015-2022 period, accumulating 2,592 observations. Binary Logistic regression is the primary analytical tool, with financial reporting fraud operationalized using the adjusted M-Score model developed by Beneish (1999). Various board characteristics such as independence, size, expertise, gender diversity, meeting frequency, and CEO duality, along with audit quality (Big4 auditors), are examined as independent variables. The empirical results reveal a significant inverse relationship between several board characteristics and the likelihood of financial reporting fraud. Specifically, an increase in the proportion of independent members on the board of directors, larger board size, and the engagement of high-quality audit firms (Big4) are found to substantially reduce the probability of financial reporting fraud. For instance, a 1% increase in independent board members is associated with a 65% reduction in fraud likelihood. The findings offer crucial theoretical and practical implications. For listed companies, they provide a strong empirical basis to enhance their corporate governance frameworks, improve oversight of management activities, and strengthen internal control systems. For Vietnamese policymakers, the study furnishes concrete evidence to support the development and implementation of policies aimed at significantly improving the reliability of financial reporting, thereby fostering a more transparent and trustworthy investment environment.