Indo-Bangladesh relations in light of the recent Rohingya crisis

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This paper seeks to explore how the international community and especially India can coordinate and cooperate with Bangladesh to deal with what is being considered the biggest refugee crisis of the 21st century.

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International Journal of Management (IJM) Volume 9, Issue 5, September–October 2018, pp. 55–64, Article ID: IJM_09_05_007 Available online at http://www.iaeme.com/ijm/issues.asp?JType=IJM&VType=9&IType=5 Journal Impact Factor (2016): 8.1920 (Calculated by GISI) www.jifactor.com ISSN Print: 0976-6502 and ISSN Online: 0976-6510 © IAEME Publication INDO-BANGLADESH RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT ROHINGYA CRISIS Rasmika Ghosh Student, Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University Abhiraj Goswami Student, Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University ABSTRACT The relations between India and Bangladesh have been favorably pleasant with minor ebbs, especially as a result of a common colonial history and shared tales of struggle. On one hand, diplomatic relations since May, 2014 have been marked by positive milestones such as the exchange of enclaves under the revised Land Boundary Agreement, which was due for decades. On the other hand, the sharing of the Teesta waters, is an issue still in limbo, perpetually lacking direction due to India’s federal narratives. At the same time, India extended a $4.5 billion credit line for infrastructural projects towards Bangladesh, in an effort to expand its influence amidst rising competition from China. Bangladesh plays a huge role when it comes to India’s concerns regarding regional cooperation as both are members of SAARC, BIMSTEC and IORA. However, of all the issues at hand, one particular situation is putting this age-old value of cooperation to the test: The Rohingya situation. The recent crisis emerging as a result of the immense influx of the Rohingyas, fleeing violence in the neighbouring country of Myanmar has caused strains in the Indo- Bangladesh relations. India’s preference towards strategic goals in Myanmar over Bangladesh’s humanitarian as well as security concerns is causing Bangladesh to feel slightly insecure and therefore lean towards China as a powerful, veto-gifted neighbour. India has been carrying out Operation Insaniyat to help out Bangladesh in dealing with the influx of Rohingyas by sending relief to Cox’s Bazar. However, in comparison to the magnitude of the crisis, India’s aid is being considered to be relatively scant by the authorities in Bangladesh. This paper seeks to explore how the international community and especially India can coordinate and cooperate with Bangladesh to deal with what is being considered the biggest refugee crisis of the 21st century. The Research method used involves content analysis of secondary data sources. Key words: History of Indo-Bangladesh relations, Regional cooperation, areas of tension and cooperation, domestic factor in formulation policies towards each other, role of major world and regional countries. 55
Indo-Bangladesh Relations in Light of the Recent Rohingya Crisis Cite this Article: Rasmika Ghosh and Abhiraj Goswami, Indo-Bangladesh Relations in Light of the Recent Rohingya Crisis. International Journal of Management, 9 (5), 2018, pp. 55–64. http://www.iaeme.com/IJM/issues.asp?JType=IJM&VType=9&IType=5 1. INTRODUCTION India shares her longest border with the country of Bangladesh. India and Bangladesh are members of the SAARC, BIMSTEC, IORA and the Commonwealth and share a cultural connect as the Indian states of West Bengal and Tripura are essentially Bengali-speaking, like Bangladesh. Bangladesh occupies an integral position when it comes to shaping of the Indian foreign policy because all models of partnership and conflict resolution have had their trial runs with Bangladesh. Conflict and cooperation are two important keywords when it comes to understanding the complex world of global politics. To be fair, both the terms are inter-dependent. History has been instrumental in teaching us that there can be no cooperation without conflict and that prolonged conflict will ideally lead to the ideas of cooperation. However, when it comes to the 21st Century, one has to stray far from this Hobbesian path as it bears little or no meaning. Definitions have changed, boundaries have shifted and yet, the term „neighbour‟ has still not lost its significance. This term, from a metaphorical and geopolitical perspective, is the cornerstone behind the relations shared between the Republic of India and the People‟s Republic of Bangladesh. Born out of conflict and through cooperation, India and Bangladesh have achieved a neighbourly relation like no other. The reasons for this are deep-rooted in culture, tradition and a common history of struggle against colonialism and ultimately, the will of self- determination. From Lord Curzon‟s Bengal partition in 1905 to Indo-Bangladesh joint military exercises in 2017, history has taken the scenic route for both these states and has proved that cooperation is the way forward. However, it would be wrong to say that the history of cooperation hasn‟t been dotted with conflict. Conflicts form an integral part of diplomatic relations as crises put cooperative values to the test and it can be concluded without doubt that both nations have passed with flying colours. However, time progresses and the nature of conflicts get increasingly challenging and the 21st Century has been integral in putting this cooperation to what could be referred to as the ultimate test. The fleeing Rohingya migrants from the neighbouring Rakhine state have been turned away by India and have been welcomed by Bangladesh, owing to international pressure. With elections, just around the corner and a number of issues, including the Teesta dispute and border infarctions returning to the limelight, India and Bangladesh have quite a bit to take care of, in order to ensure that the neighbourly relations stand tall and proud without succumbing to Robert Frost‟s maxim, “Good fences make good neighbours.” 2. HISTORY OF INDO-BANGLADESH RELATIONS The Bangladesh liberation war broke out in 1971 between East Pakistan and West Pakistan. India‟s intervention took place in December, 1971 and wholeheartedly supported East Pakistan and helped in securing the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan. India consistently supported the efforts led by Awami League leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and played a crucial role in the establishment of Bangladesh as an independent nation. India was the first country to recognize Bangladesh as a separate and independent state and established diplomatic relations with the country immediately after its independence. Bangladesh serves a pivotal position both geopolitically as well as strategically. Indira Gandhi and Bangladesh‟s http://www.iaeme.com/IJM/index.asp 56 editor@iaeme.com
Rasmika Ghosh and Abhiraj Goswami founding leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had signed the Indo-Bangladesh treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace in 1972, which was a 25-year treaty that aimed at forging close bilateral relations Almost five decades have passed since the independence and ever since, India and Bangladesh have continued to consolidate their political, economic and cultural relations and promote bilateral cooperation. However, issues such as the prolonged border dispute continued to exist even after the Land Boundary Agreement was signed on 16 May 1974 between Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman which provided for the exchange of enclaves and the surrender of adverse possessions. Bangladesh quickly ratified the agreement in 1974 but India failed to do so. The issue of the un-demarcated land boundary of approximately 6.1 kilometres remained unresolved. A revised version of the Land Boundary Agreement (1974) was adopted in 2015, in which India received 51 Bangladeshi enclaves and Bangladesh received 111 Indian enclaves. This Land Boundary Agreement (2015) which was the 100th Amendment to the Indian Constitution proved to be an important milestone in bilateral cooperation between the two countries. India and Bangladesh signed the historic treaty on the sharing of the Ganges waters at the Farakka Barrage, in 1996, which discussed the appropriate allocation and development of water resources of the Ganges river that flows all the way from Northern India to Bangladesh. This comprehensive treaty was signed between Indian Prime Minister H.D. Dev Gowda and Sheikh Hasina. This treaty established a long-term solution and considerably improved the strains in the Indo-Bangladesh relations 3. REGIONAL COOPERATION India and Bangladesh, despite their past as well as existing differences, recognize each other‟s importance when it comes to geopolitical and strategic matters. Bangladesh occupies a pivotal position in what the P.V. Narasimha Rao government called the „Look East Policy‟ and what Indian foreign minister, Sushma Swaraj is calling the „Act East Policy‟, an effort to cultivate extensive economic and strategic relations with the nations of Southeast Asia to improve her position as a regional power. This policy, without a doubt, starts with Indo-Bangladesh regional cooperation. As far as regional cooperative organisations are concerned, both India and Bangladesh are members of SAARC, BIMSTEC, IORA and The Commonwealth and their involvement in regional matters through these forums are essential for stronger ties. The First SAARC Summit in Dhaka and the Second SAARC Summit in Bangalore were essential in the establishment of a solid foundation for regional cooperation. The signing of the SAARC Charter and the Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the SAARC Secretariat were crucial to the functioning of this forum. To add to that, in the Bangalore Summit, Abu Ahsan was appointed as the first Secretary General of SAARC. Through the various SAARC Summits, India and Bangladesh have signed various documents enhancing regional understanding. Both nations are a party to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, the South Asian Food Reserve, SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, launching of the Special SAARC Travel Document, the SAARC Development Fund, SAARC Social Charter and SAARC Convention on Cooperation on Environment. In the Seventeenth Summit, India and Bangladesh agreed to four SAARC Conventions: Agreement on Rapid Response to Natural Disasters, Agreement on Multilateral Arrangement on Recognition of Conformity Assessment, Agreement on Implementation of Regional Standards and the Seed Bank Agreement. Both countries have also been on the same page http://www.iaeme.com/IJM/index.asp 57 editor@iaeme.com
Indo-Bangladesh Relations in Light of the Recent Rohingya Crisis when it came to boycotting the Nineteenth Summit, which was scheduled to take place in Islamabad. Both nations, as key members of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and take advantage of the forum for multilateral discussions on 13 sectors, wherein Bangladesh takes the lead in the sectors of trade, investments and climate change and India takes the lead in the sectors regarding transport, communication, tourism and counter-terrorism. The BIMSTEC has also been negotiating the formation of a free trade area, similar to the one existing in Europe and a milestone had been achieved in 2004 in this regard when Bangladesh signed the Framework Agreement, leading to the establishment of the Trade Negotiations Committee. BIMSTEC also maintains a close connection with the Asian Development Bank, of which both India and Bangladesh are signatories. As members of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), both India and Bangladesh have the opportunity to use this alternative forum for high level talks in the fields of maritime security, fishery management, disaster risk management, tourism and exchange of academic and scientific information. This forum is unique as it can facilitate globalization on a wider scale, as this organization contains key players in various geopolitical theaters, like Iran, Somalia, Yemen, South Africa and Thailand. The First Summit was held in 2017, in Jakarta and the future holds an immense amount of potential for this body, where 4 out of the Permanent 5 nations have been established as dialogue partners. Bangladesh and India have also discussed Coast Guard cooperation. During December, 2016, India hosted a delegation led by Director-General of the Bangladesh Coast Guard Rear Admiral Aurangzeb Chowdhury. During the visit, the two parties discussed terrorism, training of personnel, joint exercises, humanitarian endeavors, disaster management and relief and the Blue economy, which is based on the idea of using the ocean as a resource. India is committed to strengthen its cooperation with regional partners to build a sustainable ocean economy. Discussions regarding a defense cooperation framework also took place. 4. AREAS OF TENSION Growing Chinese influence: Since 2005, with China surpassing India as Bangladesh‟s largest trading partner, Chinese influence has been growing in Bangladesh, thus posing a threat to Indo-Bangladesh relations. China has turned out to be Bangladesh‟s largest economic partner, primarily due to defense trade. During 2015-16 China has sold shipping designs, technologies and provided assistance to the Bangladesh Navy. Whereas in case of Indo- Bangladesh relations, a defense cooperation framework with India was supposed to be finalized, but only a Memorandum of Understanding was signed instead during Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina‟s visit in April, 2017. China is also supervising and providing designs for submarines being built at Bangladesh‟ Kutubdia Naval base. Bangladesh and China have signed 26 agreements in October 2016, one of which was a MoU under China‟s „One belt one road‟ initiative. The OBOR which is a potential threat to Indian interests has been openly supported by Bangladesh. The „One Belt One Road‟ initiative focuses on improving connectivity and enhancing both land as well as maritime routes across Asian countries, Africa, China and Europe. This has been termed as China‟s strategy towards Economic diplomacy which will boost the country‟s domestivc growth. India has been opposed to the OBOR for the primary reason being that the CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor), which passes through Indian territory, would be a part of the OBOR. India has cited sovereignty issues and raised objections against the CPEC projects in Pakistan-occupied- Kashmir. Right now, India is the only South Asian country to not support the OBOR initiative. China and Bangladesh have agreed to establish a dialogue mechanism on maritime http://www.iaeme.com/IJM/index.asp 58 editor@iaeme.com
Rasmika Ghosh and Abhiraj Goswami cooperation. Bangladesh's strategically important geographic location, physical and political proximity to India, availability of cheap labour, and proximity to the Bay of Bengal have resulted in Bangladesh receiving such enormous bilateral assistance from a nation aspiring to be the next world leader. Bangladesh plays a primary role in China‟s „string of pearls‟ theory. Bangladesh has grown to become the second largest recipient of Chinese arms in the world. China has also been exporting arms to Pakistan and Myanmar as well. This method is being used to check India‟s dominance in this region. River water politics: The Teesta dispute has, for a considerable period, been an example where diplomatic negotiations have failed time and again. The issue over sharing the waters of the Teesta river, which originates in the Pahunri glacier in Sikkim and joins the Brahmaputra river at Fulchori in Bangladesh‟s Rangpur District for the purpose of irrigation and hydroelectric power has been a raging one since 1983 when a near equal division was proposed. Following a lack of implementation of the 1983 plan, this issue was swept under the table and was brought up again when the Awami League returned to power in 2008. In 2011, former Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh put forward an interim agreement that would divide the waters with Bangladesh receiving 37.5% and India receiving 42.5% of the waters. However, the Indian states of Sikkim and West Bengal vetoed the proposal with West Bengal‟s Chief Minister, Mamata Banerjee cancelling a Bangladesh visit she was supposed to embark on with Manmohan Singh in 2011 to talk out the issue with the neighboring state. There are political implications behind the actions of both belligerents. General elections in Bangladesh in 2018 and Panchayat elections in West Bengal have both sides playing tug of war on the issue of water sharing and the Modi government, with its assurances and promises made during a state visit to Dhaka in 2015, is clearly caught in the middle. Indo-Bangladesh cooperation would slip out of hands quickly if the 18 Party Alliance led by Begum Khaled Zia of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party comes to power, as their track record on cooperation were pretty poor, judging by the divided stances on the North-East insurgencies. Thus, it is imperative that for continued cooperation with India, the Awami League-led Grand Alliance must stay in power, and thus, the Teesta situation must be resolved. 5. THE ROHINGYA SITUATION The Rohingya are an ethnic group, largely constituted by Muslims, who primarily lived in the Western Myanmar province of Rakhine. They communicate in a Bengali dialect. Despite the fact that they have been living in the South East Asian country for generations, Myanmar considers them to be people who migrated to their land during the colonial rule and as a result, have not granted full citizenship to them. They are not entitled to be part of the civil service and their movement is restricted as well. Sectarian violence between the Rohingya and the Rakhine Buddhist natives have continued to exist. On August 25, 2017, a coordinated attack on 30 Police stations and an army base in the Rakhine State was carried out by the ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army). The ARSA is an armed guerrilla outfit which aims to fight for a „Democratic Muslim state for the Rohingya‟. „Clearance operations‟ carried out by the Myanmar Military aimed towards the ARSA has displaced and affected the lives of the Rohingya people. Several Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh from Myanmar to escape the violence. Bangladesh has opened its borders to the Rohingya on Humanitarian grounds upon the request of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. But Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina has made it evident that the large influx of Rohingya in Bangladesh is causing both logistical as well as security concerns. India, having invested largely in Myanmar, supports the Government in Myanmar. Fearing a Jihadi nexus, India refuses to take in the Rohingya. This has been resulting in wrinkles in the Indo-Bangladesh relationship. India has offered to send relief like it did in mid-September, http://www.iaeme.com/IJM/index.asp 59 editor@iaeme.com
Indo-Bangladesh Relations in Light of the Recent Rohingya Crisis airlifting 50 tonnes of relief supplies to Chittagong, assuaging International opinion as well as Bangladesh‟s irritation at being left all alone to deal with the problem. India launched „Operation Insaniyat‟ to send aid to the Rohingya in Bangladesh but this aid has been scanty in comparison to the gravity of the crisis. With the Rohingya issue, India is torn between her legacy of Humanitarianism and National interests. India is unwilling to take in Rohingya people as a result of security concerns since the ARSA is suspected to have close links with Bangladesh‟s Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (JMB) which is again, apparently backed by the Lashkar-e-Taiba. The Rakhine State has been called out as a breeding ground for radicalization owing to the violence being meted out towards the Rohingya that is resulting in their anger. Besides security concerns, India also has strategic goals in Myanmar. Bangladesh expects India, being a regional power to be far more supportive in the wake of this Humanitarian crisis. 6. IMPACT ON INDO-BANGLADESH RELATIONS As the Rohingya crisis causes wrinkles in the Indo-Bangladesh relations, China has been using it to her strategic advantage. China has made its presence robust and comprehensive in Bangladesh, especially economically. Myanmar has ended up creating a proxy contest between India and China in Bangladesh. As a result of India prioritizing her own security concerns over Bangladesh‟s, Bangladesh will tend to tilt further towards China. The Rohingya issue has caused great distress among the general public of Bangladesh. In the wake of the 2018 elections, India‟s lack of support may influence Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina to consider greater dependence on China to be wiser and more judicious. The Rohingya crisis has posed as a serious challenge to India‟s diplomacy. Myanmar not only helps India tackle threats of insurgency in the Northeast states but is also a key player in India‟s „Act East‟ policy. At the same time, India cannot afford to push Myanmar towards greater dependence on China. India is in a situation, where diplomatic decisions need to be taken with great care. On the one hand, India‟s condemnation of Myanmar will lead to Myanmar leaning towards China and a loss of India‟s strategic interests in Myanmar. On the other hand, India‟s lack of support towards Bangladesh will lead to the severance of Indo-Bangladesh relations, once again, causing a greater dependence of Bangladesh on China. The National Refugee Policy, 2014, which was enforced by the Bangladesh government failed at resolving the Rohingya issue. Although the Five-point policy did provide a basic framework as to how the crisis ought to have been dealt with, the administrative implementation was what led to this comprehensive solution go to waste. To add to that, Bangladeshi border security and the Coast Guard set their own definitions to the „No New Arrival‟ directive which was issued during the period of policy formulation, thus drastically stemming the inflow of Rohingya refugees. However, one must keep in mind that Bangladesh still has refugee camps which are able to house the refugees (like the Kutupalong and Nayapara camps in Cox‟s Bazar). India, in this regard has fallen way behind as the fleeing Rohingyas do not have a specific destination to head to and thus have been scattered amongst the native population, making them even harder to distinguish. On the international front, India can blatantly state that as it isn‟t a party to the UNHCR Convention on Refugees, it does not have to stand by the Principle of Non-Refoulement. Although India is a party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, customary international law meets vanity as the questions of national security arise, as India firmly refuses to take in refugees on that very pretext. Honouring the age-old Indo-Bangladesh bonhomie on one hand and not jeopardizing Indo-Myanmar relations seems to be the balancing act India has committed itself to. In both the cases, India must ensure that China does not get the upper hand. That would mean a http://www.iaeme.com/IJM/index.asp 60 editor@iaeme.com
Rasmika Ghosh and Abhiraj Goswami regional diplomatic disaster. It is important for India to be sensitive towards Bangladesh and be supportive of Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, who has been a strong advocate of Indo- Bangladesh ties. With Sheikh Hasina establishing Beijing as a trusted capital provider and trade partner, India has to establish itself as Bangladesh‟s permanent partner in peace-building and developmental efforts. 7. CONCLUSIONS The UNHCR and Amnesty International have asked India to adopt a Humanitarian approach towards the persecuted minority in the world, that is the Rohingya. However, India has refused to bow down to international pressure and is not willing compromise on the security of the country. India‟s support to Sheikh Hasina is crucial at this juncture. Her Awami league will be facing elections, contesting against the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jamaat-i-Islami, and in order to maintain prosperous Indo-Bangladesh relations, India needs to support Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, who has been promoting positive dynamics in Indo-Bangladesh relations. Upon historical analysis, it can be concluded that Indo-Bangladesh ties will prosper if and only if the Awami League remain in power. Things will slip out of control quickly if the 18 Party Alliance led by Khaled Zia emerges victor. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party are well known for their hardline anti-India stance and had also supported and funded insurgencies in the North-East after gaining power in 1991. This was proven in 2012 when former Inter- Services Intelligence (ISI) chief Asad Durrani confessed during a Pakistani Supreme Court hearing on the ISI mandate to having funded the BNP and supported their anti-India motives during both their terms (1991-96 and 2001-06). Thus we can see that destabilization of the North-East region is a potent threat that India will have to face in the near future if the Awami League cannot emerge victorious. To add to that, the presence of networks like Jamaat-e- Islami, which are alleged to have links with the Lashkar-e-Taiba are present in and around Pakistan and may gain ground. Sheikh Hasina‟s crackdown on Jamaat leading to acquisition of its assets is another reason as to why the Awami League is not only wanted, but also needed, as the BNP had openly collaborated with Jamaat. Terror outfits have the potential to radicalize the Rohingya on account of their vulnerability. which may lead to new situations of unimaginable magnitudes. Sheikh Hasina must have two solutions on the table prior to the elections in order to gain ground. One would be the solution to the Rohingya issue and the second, the same to the Teesta dispute. The river water dispute has been on the list of unresolved situations for the longest time and a proper solution to it will arguably be the Awami League‟s winning ticket. India must manage its federal narratives in order for this agreement to work. West Bengal is the largest deterrent to the Teesta agreement proposed by Modi in 2015. The shelving of the Rudra Commission Report proved that the West Bengal government did not want further negotiations on this matter. To add to this, in April 2017, Mamata Banerjee also proposed the linking of other rivers with Teesta to increase the water levels for sharing. As the other rivers had their sources of origin in Bhutan, this issue would no longer be limited to bilateral negotiations. Thus, as a result, Sheikh Hasina rejected this new proposal. Bangladesh is in dire need of Teesta waters during the December –April period as irrigation hits an all-time low. The lifting of the federal blockade is a must if a solution is to be achieved in this sector. However, a new solution has been proposed by the Mamata Banerjee government in September, 2017: sharing the waters of rivers Torsa, which also has a link with river Padma in Bangladesh. She had even suggested that a commission be drawn up to determine the quantity of water which ought to be shared. If this plan goes ahead, Indo-Bangladesh relations will receive a brand new boost. http://www.iaeme.com/IJM/index.asp 61 editor@iaeme.com
Indo-Bangladesh Relations in Light of the Recent Rohingya Crisis During Indian Foreign Minister, Sushma Swaraj‟s state visit to Dhaka, both Mrs. Swaraj and Mrs. Hasina were of the opinion that Myanmar ought to take back one million Rohingya refugees. Bangladeshi Foreign Minister, A.H. Mahmood Ali said that the return of all Rohingyas to the Rakhine State in Myanmar was the solution to the conflict. Both states also acknowledged the Kofi Annan Commission recommendations and agreed that it was a starting point at resolving this entire matter. The outgoing UN Resident Coordinator in Bangladesh, Robert Watkins hinted in a statement that Myanmar ought to allow more international access to the Rakhine State. In the first week of November 2017, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) had drafted a resolution, to be presented for consideration at the United Nations General Assembly: SOCHUM (Social, Cultural and Humanitarian) subcommittee. This resolution will be put to a vote on 14th November and request Myanmar to end the ongoing military operations in the Rakhine State and give access to aid workers and humanitarian support. It also takes a step further and calls upon the state to provide full citizenship to all Rohingya and at the same time urge the Myanmar government to end persecution towards the Rohingya. At the wake of this crisis, India is walking on a tight-rope and has to carefully balance both security as well as Humanitarian concerns. India cannot simple ignore the devastation and despair being faced by the Rohingya who lack a home, while prioritizing her own national security. Operation Insaniyat was a welcome move by the world community and more such endeavors ought to be encouraged as the Rohingya population in Cox‟s Bazar faces unbearable living conditions and the threat of diseases. As of now, the hope that Myanmar would consider taking them back is far-fetched. However, what we can hope is that, with increased diplomatic pressure, Myanmar can be cornered into putting a halt to what the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Zeid Ra‟ad Al Hussain, referred to as a „textbook example of ethnic cleansing‟. A well-defined balance needs to be established, where without compromising on her own national security, India provides all the necessary aid and logistical assistance to her neighbour, Bangladesh who cannot be left all alone to deal with the crisis. India has vested strategic interests in both Bangladesh as well as Myanmar and both these countries are crucial players when it comes to India‟s „Act East‟ policy. Amidst the efforts of establishing her position as a regional power and at the same time countering rising Chinese dominance in the region, the Rohingya issue proves to be a true test of India‟s Diplomacy. REFERENCES [1] Bangladesh PM Sheikh Hasina slams BNP for anti-India stance. (2017, March 11). Retrieved November 3, 2017 , from The Indian Express: https://indianexpress.com/article/world/bangladesh-pm-sheikh-hasina-slams-bnp-for-anti- india-stance/ [2] Dhaka clearly wants to see a solution. (2017 , November 3). Retrieved November 3, 2017, from The Daily Star : https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/bangladesh-paying-heavy- toll-its-generosity-1485706 [3] For Rohingya, there is no place called home. (2017 , September 4). Retrieved October 24, 2017 , from The Hindu : https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/for-rohingyas- there-is-no-place-called-home/article19620567.ece [4] Operation Insaniyat - Humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh on account of influx of refugees. (2017 , September 14). Retrieved October 24, 2017 , from Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India : https://www.mea.gov.in/press releases.htm?dtl/28944/Operation_Insaniyat__Humanitarian_assistance_to_Bangladesh_o n_account_of_influx_of_refugees http://www.iaeme.com/IJM/index.asp 62 editor@iaeme.com
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